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ABSTRACT
A growing number of bioethics papers endorse the harm
threshold when judging whether to override parental
decisions. Among other claims, these papers argue that
the harm threshold is easily understood by lay and
professional audiences and correctly conforms to societal
expectations of parents in regard to their children.
English law contains a harm threshold which mediates
the use of the best interests test in cases where a child
may be removed from her parents. Using Diekema’s
seminal paper as an example, this paper explores the
proposed workings of the harm threshold. I use
examples from the practical use of the harm threshold in
English law to argue that the harm threshold is an
inadequate answer to the indeterminacy of the best
interests test. I detail two criticisms: First, the harm
standard has evaluative overtones and judges are loath
to employ it where parental behaviour is misguided but
they wish to treat parents sympathetically. Thus, by
focusing only on ‘substandard’ parenting, harm is
problematic where the parental attempts to beneﬁt their
child are misguided or wrong, such as in disputes about
withdrawal of medical treatment. Second, when harm is
used in genuine dilemmas, court judgments offer
different answers to similar cases. This level of
indeterminacy suggests that, in practice, the operation of
the harm threshold would be indistinguishable from best
interests. Since indeterminacy appears to be the greatest
problem in elucidating what is best, bioethicists should
concentrate on discovering the values that inform best
interests.
INTRODUCTION
Where medical decisions must be made for infants,
English law directs decision-makers—primarily
parents and doctors—to follow the best interests
test. Yet judgments of best interests have long been
criticised for their indeterminacy since they can be
informed by a variety of values.1 Many bioethicists
have also argued that parents, who must juggle
their own needs, and potentially those of siblings as
well, with those of the child, are poorly directed by
the literal demand that they do what is best for the
child.2 Of the many critiques that have arisen from
such analysis is the claim that the best interests test
should be mediated3 4 (or perhaps replaced)5 with
a harm threshold for overriding parental decisions.
These critics maintain that a harm threshold more
adequately reﬂects the wide range of discretion
parents are customarily allowed in their behaviours
towards their child, and guides professionals by
indicating that only harmful parental actions justify
intervention. But would a harm threshold really be
more understandable and strike the correct balance
between parental liberty and children’s interests?
English law already contains a harm threshold,
perhaps overlooked by bioethicists because it is
rarely used in determinations of medical best inter-
ests. The experiences of the English courts in
applying the harm threshold suggest that it is con-
sidered signiﬁcantly more evaluative than, and
suffers from similar levels of indeterminacy to, the
best interests test. This paper therefore argues that
mediating best interests with a harm threshold is ill
judged, and efforts should instead be spent on
reducing indeterminacy by specifying the values
that should guide best interests decisions.
THE HARM CONSENSUS
Many commentators suggest that best interests is an
opaque test1 4 6 7 that, taken literally, places unfair
demands upon parents who will face the paradox
of simultaneously trying to maximise beneﬁts to all
of their children while somehow maintaining their
own well-being.2 6–8 In the face of these apparent
problems with the best interests test, these com-
mentators argue that a harm threshold should
mediate (or perhaps replace) best interests.3–7 9
Calls to replace the best interests test5 are ambigu-
ous because it is not clear if it is meant to apply
only to speciﬁc uses of the test. To keep things
simple, I will concentrate on claims that the harm
standard should mediate best interests, in other
words a harm threshold should govern which cases
we consider appropriate to be decided by the best
interests test.
Although accepting that best interests is the best
guide for decision-making on behalf of a child,
Diekema argues that the harm threshold is superior
to best interests when judging whether intervention
is justiﬁed against parental refusals of medical treat-
ment.4 9 Elliston6 argues that intervention against
parental decisions should only be made on the
basis of harm, and only then if the choice that
leads to those harms is unreasonable. Others
suggest more speciﬁc uses for the harm threshold.
Shah7 proposes a ‘secure child standard’ should
govern parental decisions to enter children into
research. Under this standard the courts should
‘defer to parental decision-making unless the child
is exposed to some unjustiﬁed risk of signiﬁcant
harm’ (at 179). de Vos et al3 claim that parental
requests for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
should be allowed if they do not increase the risk
of preventable harm. Gillam10 argues that harm
indicates the scope of parental decision-making in
situations of genuine dilemma. Indeed, a recent
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review11 suggests that there is widespread consensus among
bioethicists that the harm threshold should determine the per-
missibility of overriding parental wishes. I dispute the usefulness
of these conclusions. While avoiding harm has been convin-
cingly claimed to be the single moral principle likely to be
common to all cultures and philosophies,12 this is only likely
because harm can be understood in numerous ways, and these
will not always be consistent with one another. The use of the
harm threshold in English law exempliﬁes this, and I shall
discuss this in due course.
No critique of the harm threshold can ignore Diekema’s4
seminal paper, which remains the most considered and widely
referenced discussion of the issue. While I concentrate upon
Diekema’s analysis, my focus here is on developing a general cri-
tique of insufﬁciency of the harm threshold for overriding par-
ental decisions.
THE HARM THRESHOLD EXPLAINED
Diekema considers that parenting children is a basic liberty
right. He identiﬁes the harm threshold ﬁrst with Mill’s13 asser-
tion that the only circumstance in which personal liberty may be
infringed by a community is to prevent harm to others, and
second with Feinberg’s14 argument that such infringement must
be effective and the option of last resort. In order to further
deﬁne the concept, Diekema links harm to a second concept,
basic needs.i While Diekema does not deﬁne these, basic needs
are predicated upon Rawls’ natural primary goods, the things ‘a
rational man wants whatever else he wants’ (at 79),15 and for
children might form a notional list containing the minimum
that will ‘enable children to embark … on the process of self-
discovery, self-determination and self-fulﬁlment’ (at 42).16 Using
Feinberg’s contention that harm is the thwarting of an interest,
Diekema argues that the existence of harms in children can be
determined by the degree to which children’s basic needs are
provided for. Where a parent persistently fails to provide for a
child’s basic needs, harm is caused. Should these failures be sig-
niﬁcant and serious, intervention is warranted.
Diekema acknowledges that the non-self-evident nature of
harm, even when coupled with terms like ‘signiﬁcant’ and
‘serious’, means that the harm principle suffers from problems
of indeterminacy.ii Diekema counterargues that a threshold
based upon harm better ﬁts the point where intervention against
parental wishes is justiﬁed in practice and is therefore less likely
to cause confusion in clinicians than the obfuscatory language
of best interests. Dresser,5 arguing along similar lines, makes this
point succinctly when she argues that it is difﬁcult to conceive
that male circumcision for religious purposes serves the child’s
best interests, yet the purportedly harmless nature of male cir-
cumcision leads to its widespread acceptance in many cultures.
While harm is nevertheless indeterminate, it is only fair to say
that Diekema does not appear overly concerned with indeter-
minacy, for he states (at 253):
The biggest problem with a best interest standard is not its sub-
jectivity, but that it represents the wrong standard. State interven-
tion is not justiﬁed because a decision is contrary to the child’s
best interest, but because it places the child at signiﬁcant risk of
serious harm. Discussing the child’s ‘best interest’ fails to focus
on the relevant standard for determining when state action is jus-
tiﬁed. The harm standard focuses discussion in the proper place.4
Yet I suggest that Diekema, and others who have adopted his
arguments, make a fundamental mistake. The challenge of inde-
terminacy is the central problem of the best interests test, and
merely switching terminologies from best interests to harm does
nothing to address this in any of the circumstances it has been
proposed. Indeed, for reasons I explain below, the change in ter-
minology is also unhelpful.
THE HARM THRESHOLD CRITICISED AND DEFENDED
Diekema’s contention that parental authority is a liberty right
akin to any other exercise of autonomy is vulnerable to critique.
The notion that personal liberty extends to parental autonomy
—quite possibly a misuse of Mill’s doctrineiii—conﬂicts with
claims that children have rights on their own account. Such
rights are often argued to extend beyond simple claims to phys-
ical integrity to at least leave some space for presumptive self-
determination,16 17 most cogently seen in Feinberg’s18 argument
that children have a right to an open future.iv On such a basis
Hester19 argues bioethicists should go further than simply pre-
venting harm and specify some positive interests of children
which we are obliged to protect. While he does not develop the
argument, Diekema’s speciﬁcation of harm as damage to basic
needs does not prevent us from making some positive speciﬁca-
tion of harms, which might deﬂect this critique somewhat.
A second argument advanced by a number of authors4 6 7 9 is
that the harm threshold is more readily understood than best
interests by legislators, doctors and parents. This claim is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, although harm may appear a
readily understandable concept, the ready understandability
hides the fact that judgements of harm, especially in complex
ethical dilemmas, contain complex value judgments. For
example, fatal withdrawal of treatment is a harm of indeﬁnable
proportions—perhaps catastrophic, or perhaps not even harm at
all. While, for the sake of brevity, I accept without argument
(here) that fatal withdrawal of treatment is sometimes justiﬁably
in a patient’s interests,20 such situations do not always sit well
with the concept of harm as understood in the vernacular. This
muddles the claim that harm is the correct threshold because it
is simple enough to be generally understood and suggests harm
is at least as problematic as best interests in this regard.v
This indicates a second, related, problem: harm may not
capture all the considerations we need to capture to make a
decision. This is problematic because if harm is the only
concept on which attention can justiﬁably be focused, this
invites any otherwise justiﬁable claims against interests which
are not readily labelled as harms to nevertheless be labelled as
harms. Such labelling inevitably transforms the harm threshold
iLists of basic needs are rarely speciﬁed, and Rawls speciﬁed only an
incomplete list which included health and vigour, intelligence and
imagination. Basic needs (or their inverse, basic interests) may be
criticised separately, although this is not the focus of this paper.
iiThereby anticipating criticisms from those who feel that harm is too
anaemic or plastic a concept.
iiiSince Mill argued the state might place very great restrictions upon
parenting and complains: “it is in the case of children, that misapplied
notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulﬁlment by the State of its
duties. One would think that a man’s children were supposed to be
literally, rather than metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is
opinion of the smallest interference of law with his absolute and
exclusive control over them; more jealous than of almost any
interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the
generality of mankind value liberty than power” (at 88–89).13
ivEven those who dispute claims that children have rights tend to accept
that children have interests.
vAlbeit we have little evidence of how best interests are understood in
this context.
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into a complex test when it is used in the wide variety of situa-
tions wherein the best interest test is currently employed. While
I concede that, unembellished, claims of self-evident physical
harm might provide one plausible standard to judge overriding
a parental consent and refusal in some contexts (such as vaccin-
ation, intrasibling tissue donation and paediatric research)—
albeit one that remains contestable on the basis of the
non-self-evidence of parental rights—any appeal to clarity is lost
once harm is the only gateway to the best interests test. Indeed,
because English law contains a harm threshold, we have exam-
ples of these problems at ﬁrst hand.vi
THE HARM THRESHOLD IN ENGLISH LAW
English law uses a harm threshold in cases where a child may
be removed from its parents.vii Only if a child is being
harmed or is at risk of harm will the court decide what home
serves the child’s best interests, removing the implication that
the law will seek better-than-adequate parents for a child.21
Thus the law has similarities to the harm threshold envisaged
by some commentators for medical decision-making,viii and
examining how the threshold operates in the courts highlights
two potential problems. First, as I shall detail in a moment it
seems arguable that judges see evaluative overtones in a con-
clusion that a parent is harming their child, which they do
not (explicitly)ix read into best interests. This indicates more
general difﬁculties with a harm threshold when a decision to
override parental consent appears necessary on grounds other
than substandard care. This non-pejorative approach is gener-
ally taken because there is sympathy towards the parents’
motivation—for instance in disputes over the withdrawal or
withholding of treatment or disputes motivated by the
parents’ religious beliefs—and the label of substandard care
appears insensitive to pluralism.x Second, as we shall see
shortly, when the harm threshold is used to address genuine
dilemmas, judgments of harm become as indeterminate as
judgments of best interests.
My ﬁrst claim is that the courts view ‘harm’ as implicitly a
more evaluative term than ‘best interests’. This is not to claim
that the best interests test does not involve evaluation, but
instead to argue that, as a legal term of art, a judgement that an
action is against a child’s best interests may appear less pejora-
tive than a judgement that an action is harmful. The way the
courts use harm to narrowly focus upon (defective) parental
care, and reserve best interests to consider a much wider range
of issues than the harm threshold gives reasons for thinking this
is the case.
An indication of this is the general avoidance of the term
‘harm’ in English legal cases where the courts do not wish to
indicate that parental care is substandard. For example, religious
refusal to consent to life-saving blood products is not described
as harm in contemporary cases.xi While I acknowledge a variety
of explanations for this approach—for instance application of
the harm threshold is demanded by statute only in cases where
the courts consider applications for care and supervision or resi-
dence and contact orders—an approach favouring the use of
best interests under the inherent jurisdiction of the court has
arguably arisen because of reservations about using the harm
standard where the courts perceive a legitimate plurality of
views.
If the aim is to respect parental privacy in parenting, it is of
course sustainable to say that the pejorative connotations of the
language used are moot since interference on any basis is prob-
lematic for the parents concerned. Yet the family courts regu-
larly perceive that, as well as the parents concerned, they
address standards of parenting in general,xii and in this context
concerns about language may gain more traction. It might
nevertheless be argued that the lack of transparency in the best
interests test make it a more problematic way to offer this more
general guidance to parents. Yet this assumes that guidance on
the basis of harms is more transparent, a claim I shall now
dispute.
THE INDETERMINACY OF HARMS
The indeterminate nature of harms raises a second problem that
challenges claims that the harm threshold is more readily under-
standable than best interests. The deﬁnition of harm at section
31(9) of the Children Act 1989 as ‘ill-treatment or the impair-
ment of health or development’ might appear clear and unam-
biguous. Yet, given that such a deﬁnition will include a wide
range of circumstances, juridical use of the harm threshold has
suffered from indeterminacy:xiii for example, the question of
whether a child’s cultural background should affect an assess-
ment of the seriousness of harm has been answered negatively
and positively in different cases.xiv
A stark demonstration of the indeterminacy of harms is in a
series of reports of baby trafﬁcking cases Haringey Local
Authority v C,23 Re E,24 Re D25 and Re A.26 These cases share a
series of key features: all concern childless couples of African
origin living in the UK who attend charismatic Christian
churches. Conventional fertility treatments had failed these
couples and all had sought unconventional treatments at clinics
in Africa. Most admitted paying large sums of money for these
treatments, after which many of the women had experienced
phantom pregnancy (pseudocyesis). All had contacted their
family doctors in the UK in the belief they were pregnant, and,
if examined (one was not), were found not to be. All had under-
gone labour in African clinics, and were presented with babies
who were removed by the state authorities when they returned
viAlthough my focus is on English law, my understanding is that other
common law jurisdictions such as the USA and Australia use the harm
threshold similarly in cases of child abuse or neglect.
viiThe Children Act 1989 section 1 (3–4) speciﬁes a harm threshold is to
be used residence and contact orders, and care and supervision orders,
respectively known also as section 8 orders and part 4 orders. The
circumstances of which these orders may be sought is elaborated at
section 31(2).
viiiIndeed Elliston explicitly favours the extension of this model.6
ixA number of commentators argue that they do so implicitly, however I
do not think this negates my argument, since I acknowledge the
indeterminacy of best interests test is a problem.22
xWhether the care is indeed substandard depends upon one’s
metaethical (and jurisprudential) stance.
xiConsider refusal of consent to blood in, for example, Birmingham
Children’s NHS Trust v B & C (2014) EWHC 531 (Fam); M Children’s
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Mr & Mrs Y (2014) EWHC 2651
(Fam) NHS v Child B, Mr and Mrs B (2014) EWHC 3486 (Fam);
Refusal of consent for HIV treatment represents a rare case that attracts
the opposite approach e.g. Re JA (A Minor) (2014) EWHC 1135 (Fam).
It could be convincingly argued that the approach here was due to the
facts of the case.
xiiConsider, for example, Re H-B (2015) EWCA Civ 389
xiiiThe persistent ambiguity of corporal punishment in English law is
another ﬁne example, although since it is usually outside the ambit of
the harm threshold (being instead governed by the Children Act 2004,
s58(3) and case law, most notably R v H (2001) 2 FLR 431) it would be
digressive to include it in the main discussion.
xivCompare Re D (Care: Threshold Criteria) (1998) Fam Law 656 and A
Local Authority v N (2005) EWHC 2956 (Fam).
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to the UK. None of the women were DNA matches for their
child, although all were nevertheless convinced the child was
theirs. In every case their physical and emotional care of the
child was thought to be exemplary. Despite these strong similar-
ities, the courts reached differing conclusions about whether the
harm threshold had been reached. Thus in Haringey Local
Authority v C,23 while Ryder J believed that the ‘mother’ had
been the victim of a cruel deception, he ruled the child was at
risk of harms consisting of growing up with false beliefs that he
was a miraculous birth, potentially experiencing devastating
consequences if he discovered his true origin and of facing pos-
sible difﬁculties due to the lack of family medical history. The
child was permanently removed from the ‘mother’ on this basis.
While there is no public report on the outcome of Re E,24 the
judge was unimpressed with the ‘mother’ as a witness, and her
comments suggest a similar conclusion regarding harms was
drawn.xv Conversely, in Re D,25 the judge considered both
parents to have been the victims of an elaborate scam. The case
attracted signiﬁcant attention and the media reported the couple
had been allowed to keep the baby.27 28 Most recently, a media
report following Re A26 states the putative parents were allowed
to keep the child,29 the judge in this case concluding that,
although the child had been harmed, the harm was not inﬂicted
by the couple.
Common law is open to interpretation, and I shall not argue
that the judges in one case or another erred in their application
of the harm threshold. Instead I claim that, wherever it is
employed, the harm threshold can readily be used to reach
opposing conclusions in very similar circumstances. This indi-
cates the harm threshold suffers problems of indeterminacy of
similar magnitude to the best interests test. For this reason,
replacing or mediating the best interests test with a harm thresh-
old is misguided; the real issue that bioethicists should focus
upon is reducing indeterminacy.
REDUCING INDETERMINACY
Almost 30 years ago Moreno30 observed:
in the case of non-competent patients—those who never have
been in a position to develop relevant preferences such as young
children […] some best interests test, founded on the ethical prin-
ciple of beneﬁcence, seems required. But, in itself, the notion of
best interests is vacuous, and so further principles must be
invoked in its interpretation.
Rather than specify some of these principles, advocates of the
harm threshold seek to simplify the best interests test.
Diekema’s4 tying of the threshold to the concept of basic needs
is alert to this problem, since an ‘objective’ list of such welfare
needs would answer this criticism—although reaching agree-
ment on the speciﬁcs of such a list is problematic.31 However,
harm does not describe all the parental behaviours that merit
state intervention, and Diekema errs in suggesting that it does.
‘Harm’ is a catch-all term with which few could disagree. It cap-
tures the wrongness of hitting a child around the head with a
saucepan or abusing a child for pleasure. Yet these situations do
not represent genuine dilemmas when we would need the guid-
ance of a harm threshold, since almost nobody would argue
that such actions were permissible. It is in situations of genuine
ethical complexity that a focus on harm becomes inadequate,
and, if used in such situations, harm merely frames more
complex ethical judgements. Once harm is invested with com-
plexity, unless the complex rules it follows are explained, it
becomes open to charges of indeterminacy. All we have done is
rename the best interests test while dealing with none of its fail-
ings. Moreover, because harm is implicitly evaluative, it is prob-
lematic when there is genuine cause to intervene in parental
behaviour, but no cause for public condemnation. In fact, I
suggest that in these situations the technical language of best
interests is actually helpful, precisely because it can house
complex concepts without attaching condemnation.
The trigger and scope for intervention against parental wishes
does of course vary depending upon the situation encountered.
But it would be a mistake to view harm as the only consider-
ation we should pay heed to in such cases. Issues such as refusal
of vaccination, or the place of parental consent for children’s
entry into clinical trials raise issues of communal as well as
child-centred responsibilities. Issues which balance one child’s
interests against another require a broad consideration of bene-
ﬁts to one party as well as harms to the other. Harm can be a
valuable intuition pump that can lead us to consider important
factors pertaining to a child’s best interests. However, absent
some list of other values, judging best interests and harms is
inevitably subjective. The best response to this indeterminacy is
not to attempt to rename the best interests test, but to identify
the values informing best interests. It is likely that rather than a
single monolithic value, there are many such values that apply
more or less to different situations. Although identifying such
values is therefore beyond the scope of this paper, examples
abound. For instance, it is clear that many bioethicists, including
many advocates of the harm threshold, consider that the child’s
interests can be subordinate to the interests of their
parents.4 6 7 9 Other theorists favour a broadly collectivist
approach that requires a restriction of parental capacity to
beneﬁt as well as to disbeneﬁt.17 32 To publicise such positions
in a decision about best interests allows transparency and offers
grounds for challenge. To rehearse and debate the validity of
such positions is genuinely informative of assessments of best
interests in a way that adopting a harm threshold is not.
CONCLUSION
Many commentators advocate a harm threshold to mediate the
best interests test because they claim it is more determinate than
the best interests test, and more clearly reﬂects the freedoms of
parents to decide how and when to beneﬁt their children.
Diekema,4 the harm threshold’s most convincing advocate,
acknowledges that harm has similar problems with indetermin-
acy to best interests, but also argues that a harm threshold is
better understood by clinicians than best interests, an argument
that others have extended to the judiciary and to parents
themselves.
While recognising the potential for a harm threshold to have
uses as an intuition pump or a cross-cultural standard, this
paper argues that where a harm threshold is used to determine
intervention, it is inferior to the best interests test. I have used
the way the harm threshold operates in English law to demon-
strate it is insufﬁciently broad in its scope to be helpful in genu-
inely troubling cases without carrying with it signiﬁcant
elements of indeterminacy. Such complexity invalidates claims
that the harm threshold is readily understandable in all cases.
Furthermore, the language of harm is strongly evaluative, ren-
dering it less suitable than the technicolegal language of best
interests when intervening against well-intentioned parental
behaviours without wishing to condemn such behaviours.
xvParker J (at paragraph 3) states the harm threshold is ‘amply made out’
despite not forming part of the (fact ﬁnding) ruling.
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None of this mitigates the indeterminacy of the best interests
test, and this paper has contended that this is the greatest chal-
lenge to deciding children’s interests. Recourse to a harm
threshold offers nothing to this project, and the focus of
bioethicists should be upon identifying and mapping the values
that (should) inform best interests decisions.
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